Abstract-Following the Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA) and the Cloud paradigms, an increasing number of organizations implement their business processes and applications via runtime composition of services made available on the cloud by single suppliers. This scenario however introduces new security risks and threats, as the service providers may not provide the level of assurance required by their customers. There is therefore the need of a new certification scheme for services that provides trusted evidence that a service has some security properties, and a matching infrastructure to compare service certificates with users' certification preferences. In this paper, we propose a first solution to the definition of a testbased certification process for SOA.
I. INTRODUCTION
Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA) and Cloud computation paradigms provide the basis to integrate applications across a global ICT infrastructure, allowing remote users to access information and services supplied by service providers. Organizations increasingly implement their business processes via run-time (as opposed to designtime) selection and composition of such services [6] , that communicate over the ICT infrastructure by using standard Web protocols and technology [3] .
Such a flexible implementation of a business process in an open service ecosystem exposes applications to new security risks and threats. This increases users' concerns about the security of services, e.g., against penetration or Denial-ofService attacks, as well as about the protection of the data disclosed to them, e.g., as input parameters. Pushing the SOA vision on an open ICT infrastructure requires careful re-thinking of current development, testing, and verification methodologies, and introduces the need of new assurance techniques that will increase the users' trust that services will satisfy their functional and non-functional requirements.
Certification can play a role to establish a trust model suitable for service ecosystems. Existing certification techniques and protocols (e.g., Common Criteria [4] ) however have been defined for traditional monolithic software components rather than services. In particular, they provide engineers in charge of software procurement with human-readable evidences, based on testing and formal verification signed by a trusted third party, that a software product has some features, conforms to specified requirements, and behaves as expected [1] . These techniques are not suitable for a servicebased scenario that requires dynamic and machine-readable certificates to be used in service selection and composition.
In this paper, we propose a certification scheme that can be used at run-time to make trusted assurance information available in a service ecosystem. Security certification of services is a recent idea and can represent an important plus for open SOAs, allowing users to evaluate different services and select the appropriate ones for service composition [2] . In the remainder of the paper, we present a first solution to the problem of test-based certification of services, including how test-based certificates can be automatically matched with users' preferences on the certification process. Starting from this definition, a certification process for services should define a machine-readable certificate format linking a set of properties with the evidence supporting them. To this aim, a service-oriented certification scheme defines a hierarchy H P of security properties and the classes of tests that can be used to prove that some test has been carried out on a service and a property holds. Hierarchy H P of security properties. Formally, a hierarchy H P of security properties is a pair (P, P ), where P is the set of all security properties, and P is a partial order relationship over P. Given two properties p i and p j in P, we say that p i P p j if p i is an abstraction of p j . For instance, (return parameter) integrity is an abstraction of properties crypt&sign, sign&crypt (i.e., integrity P crypt&sign, integrity P sign&crypt). This means that each request for a service that guarantees a property of integrity of its return parameter will also be satisfied by a service showing a certificate for a property that is dominated by integrity. Figure 1(a) shows an example of hierarchy of security properties. As shown in the figure, each security property (black squares) is also characterized by a set A of class attributes (dashed squares) that refer to a set of threats the service proves to counteract or to specific characteristics of the security function that is certified. Each attribute a∈A is characterized by a total order relationship ≥. For instance, a service may expose a certificate proving that it supports a (return parameter) confidentiality property with a 3DES algorithm and a key of 112bits. Here, we use class attributes to distinguish between properties that are operationally different although share the same name. Class attributes also simplify the matching process between the certificate held by a service and the users' preferences. A user may in fact require a service proving confidentiality with 3DES algorithm and a key of at least 168bits.
II. BASIC CONCEPTS OF TEST-BASED

Classes of tests.
Each security property in P can be associated with zero or more test units used to certify it. Test units are organized in hierarchies. Formally, a hierarchy H T of test units is a pair (T , T ), where T is the set of all test units, and T is a partial order relationship over T . Given two test units t i and t j in T , t i T t j if t i is an abstraction of t j . Test units are then organized in classes of tests having a set TA of test attributes. Each test attribute ta∈TA is characterized by a total order relationship ≥. Figure 1(b) shows an example of classes of tests together with hierarchies of test units. For instance, in Figure 1(b In our vision, each test-based certificate is composed by: i) a (set of) property and related class attributes (called security property below); ii) a (set of) evidence signed by a third party proving that the service supports that property. An evidence is composed by a set of test units and test attributes.
III. DOUBLE-MATCHING STRATEGY
The traditional SOA paradigm consists of an infrastructure where services are searched and composed at run-time based on the users' preferences. Our service certification scheme should then be integrated within the existing SOA infrastructure and complement it by providing a mechanism where users define their preferences in terms of certified properties, evidence, and tests, and automatically match them against the certificates awarded to the services. Runtime certificate matching will then permit the users to evaluate if the assurance level provided by the service certificate is compatible with their own preferences.
In our scenario, we need a double-matching strategy which involves a check both on security properties (propertymatch) [5] and on evidences (evidence-match) in the certificate. More in detail, let S be a service with a certificate C (P 1 ,E 1 ). . .(P n ,E n ) , where P i is a security property (p i ,A i ) with p i a property in P and A i = {a i,1 , . . . , a i,l } a set of class attributes, and E i is an evidence (t i ,TA i ) with t i a test unit in T and TA i = {ta i,1 , . . . , ta i,k } a set of test attributes. Also, let R (P 1 ,E 1 ). . .(P m ,E m ) be the preferences of the user in the form of a service request, where P j is a security property (p j ,A j ) with p j the requested property in P and A j = {a j,1 , . . . , a j,s } a set of class attributes, and E j is an evidence (t j ,TA j ) with t j a test unit in T and TA j = {ta j,1 , . . . , ta j,z } a set of test attributes. In the following, for the sake of simplicity, we will consider certificates and requests of the form C(P ,E) and R(P ,E ), respectively, where P =(p,A), E=(t,TA), P =(p ,A ), and E =(t ,TA ). The matching process between a certificate C and a request R, denoted as C×R, is defined as follows.
Definition 3.1 (Matching process): Let C(P ,E) be a certificate awarded to a service and R(P ,E ) be a user request. The matching process C×R is a process that first compares P and P (property-match). If and only if this comparison succeeds, the matching process compares E and E (evidence-match). The matching process is successful if and only if both property-match and evidence-match succeed.
C×R can return two results as follows: 1) match, if and only if: i) p P p, and ∀a ∈ A , ∃a ∈ A s.t a ≥ a (property-match), and ii) t T t , and ∀ta ∈ TA , ∃ta ∈TA s.t ta ≥ ta (evidence-match). 2) no match, otherwise. In the following we discuss the match/no match scenarios by means of two examples on the single case study shown in Figure 2 . Figure 2 presents an example of a successful matching between a service certificate (blue line) and the user's preferences in the form of a service request (red dashed line). In particular, let us consider an (enhanced) UDDI registry that contains a set of services with their certificates.
1 Also, let us consider a service S in the registry that has a certificate C proving a security property (p,A)=(Robustness.WS Input Malformation,{Type=Malformed XML Tree}) with evidence (t,TA)=(Penetration test using Malformed XML Tree,{n=k}). Suppose now that a user submits a request R to the registry searching for a service that has a certificate proving a generic security property (p ,A )=(Robustness.WS Input Malformation,{}) with evidence (t ,TA )=(Penetration test using NonValid XML Tree,{n=m}), with TA.n>TA .n, where TA.n and TA n are the cardinalities of the test sets. The registry searches among its services and selects those that expose a certificate C with a security property (p i ,A i ) that matches with the security property (p ,A ) in R (property-match). Service S is considered for matching since p P p based on the hierarchy in Figure 1(a) 2 and the set of class attributes is empty in R meaning that any combination of attributes in the certificate is acceptable. Among the selected services, the registry compares the evidence in the certificate with the evidence in the request (evidence-match). Considering service S, it is clear that the evidences match because t T t and TA.n>TA .n. As a result, C×R=match. Figure 2 presents an example of failed matching between service certificate (blue line) and user's preferences (red dashed line). Again, let us consider a UDDI registry that contains a set of services together with their certificates. Also, let 1 Extensions to UDDI registry metadata including test outcomes have been proposed by several research groups [7] . 2 In the example, p and p are the same security property. In general, p may be an abstraction of p.
Example 2 (No-Match). The right part of
us consider a service S that has a certificate C proving a security property (p,A)=(Robustness.WS Input Malformation,{Type=Compliance with Application Schema in the WSDL}) with evidence (t,TA)=(Penetration test using WellFormed XML Tree,{n=k}). Suppose now, that a user is submitting a request R to the registry searching for a service that has a certificate proving a generic security property (p ,A )=(Robustness.WS Input Malformation,{}) with evidence (t ,TA )=(Penetration test using Malformed XML Tree,{n=m}), with TA.n>TA .n, where TA.n and TA .n are the cardinalities of the test sets. As in Example 1, service S is considered for matching since p P p based on the hierarchy in Figure 1(a) and the set of class attributes is empty in R (property-match). However, in this example, there is no evidence-match because, although TA.n>TA .n, t T t . As a result, C×R=no-match.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We presented some preliminary ideas on basic mechanisms for integrating test-based certification in a SOA scenario. Our future work will focus on the definition of a machine-readable certificate format, the definition of complete hierarchy of security properties and classes of tests, the matching and comparison between different classes of tests and between non-quantitative or unordered test units (e.g., penetration tests involving different inputs), the comparative evaluation between certificates of different services that match the users' preferences, and the problem of certifying dynamically composed services, starting from the composition of the certificates of their basic components.
